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Abstract. Literature on knowledge protection strongly focuses on the applica-
tion of measures, widely neglecting the abilities of individual firms. A capabil-
ity view on firms could help to answer the question of how well they can utilize 
different measures for protecting knowledge. Drawing on the resource-based 
view, this paper proposes the concept of protection capabilities and discusses 
how they could help firms to protect knowledge. Protection capabilities are 
conceptualized as a capability model that mirrors the identification, assimila-
tion, and application capabilities as defined in the model of absorptive capacity. 
As a result, firms need to develop three types of capabilities: (1) concealment to 
protect their resources, (2) ambiguity to protect their capabilities and (3) en-
forcement to protect their business strategies. This paper discusses how each 
capability type reduces the risk of external organizations absorbing knowledge, 
and gives examples of what role IT plays in building each of the capability 
types. 
 
Keywords: knowledge protection, capabilities, resource-based view, absorptive 
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1 Introduction  
Literature on knowledge protection strongly focuses on the application of formal 
and informal measures [1-3] mainly addressing the question of how effective can dif-
ferent protection measures be applied. Characteristics like firm size [4, 5], affiliation 
to specific industry sectors [4, 5], or resource characteristics [6] have been identified 
as factors influencing the effectiveness of protection. Rarely attention has been paid to 
individual firms’ abilities to protect. However, the effectiveness of knowledge protec-
tion depends on the individual company and situational aspects [7] and, hence, 
knowledge protection should be more than applying formal measures in a generalized 
way [8, 9]. Instead of solely focusing on how effective different measures can be 
applied, literature should stronger focus on how well can a specific firm utilize differ-
ent measures. One perspective that accounts for individual organizational abilities to 
protect is the concept of capabilities. Capabilities are routines and processes which 
make use of a specific combination of resources [10, 11]. In knowledge protection 
literature, this capability perspective has been discussed from the resource-based view 
(RBV) in two ways: (1) knowledge protection as a set of capabilities itself and (2) 
measures to reduce the risk that external organizations
1
 absorb knowledge [12], or 
influencing factors thereof [6]. In (1), authors discuss capabilities for knowledge pro-
tection [3, 13, 14], however, do not always make clear distinctions between the con-
cepts of capabilities and resources and, hence, it remains unclear what the nature of 
protection capabilities is. For (2), the focus is on proposing protection measures or 
identifying influencing factors of reducing the risks that externals absorb knowledge. 
However, this view does not focus on protection capabilities. 
This paper tries to address these issues following the call by Desouza and 
Vanapalli [14] for a stronger focus on protection capabilities in knowledge protection 
literature, e.g. by developing capability models. Protection capabilities are introduced 
and conceptualized as a model that helps firms to reduce the risk that externals identi-
fy, assimilate, and apply knowledge as defined in the model of absorptive capacity. 
Moreover, the model tries to explain two things: (1) what is protected by the proposed 
capabilities, i.e. core knowledge (resource level), knowledge capabilities (capability 
level), or the business strategy of a firm (strategy level). And (2) where is the impact, 
i.e. on reducing the risk that externals identify, assimilate, or apply knowledge. 
2 Foundations 
The following foundation section is based on a profound literature review [15] and 
describes one specific part of it, i.e. knowledge protection from the perspective of the 
RBV. 
2.1 Knowledge Protection  
Knowledge protection is about the prevention of (a) unwanted knowledge spill-
overs [16], (b) knowledge loss [17], and (c) the reduction of knowledge visibility 
[18]. (a) Focuses on leakage of knowledge to not authorized people, (b) on leaving or 
retiring employees, and (c) is concerned with observability of knowledge by exter-
nals. Hence, knowledge protection focuses on the confidentiality aspect of knowledge 
and has to be differentiated from the wider concept of knowledge security. The latter 
is concerned with both external and internal confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of knowledge [19] which is not the focus of this paper.  
Literature on knowledge protection argues from three theoretical lenses [9]: trans-
action cost theory (TCE) [3], the relational perspective [6, 20], and the RBV [12, 13]. 
TCE scholars suggest that firms should rather use equity- based partnerships to pro-
tect knowledge. The relational perspective focuses on how relational capital, i.e. mu-
tual trust, respect, and friendship in inter-organizational relationships helps to protect 
knowledge.  
                                                          
1 In the following referred to as externals and described both organizations in a partnership with 
the focal firm as well as competitors. 
2.2 Knowledge Protection and the Resource-Based View of the Firm 
Scholars occupying the RBV argue that a firm can sustain its competitive ad-
vantages only when their competitors cannot acquire or imitate the firm’s capabilities 
and resources [21], whilst there is a need to leverage resources from outside of the 
firm due to limited internal resources [22]. Central to RBV are the concepts of re-
source, capability, and business strategy. A firm’s resources are input into a firm’s 
production process [10], are manifold and can be separated into tangible resources 
and intangible resources [23]. Tangible ones are financial or physical resources, 
whilst intangible ones can be further separated into person-independent resources 
(intangible assets, organizational culture, routines) and person dependent resources 
(tacit and explicit knowledge) [23]. Capabilities are “integrated combinations, consol-
idations or applications of resources in an organizational context” [23]. They involve 
complex patterns of various resources and people, and are made up of a sequence of 
coordinated actions, i.e. organizational routines [10]. Substantive capabilities are rou-
tines that make use of the resources in a sense that they provide a set of decision op-
tions for a firm [11, 24]. Dynamic capabilities refer to the ability to change or recon-
figure substantive capabilities [11]. After building capabilities firms have to appraise 
the rent-generating potential of resources and capabilities as well as to select a busi-
ness strategy exploiting the resources and capabilities best, relative to external oppor-
tunities to build and sustain competitive advantage [23].  
From the perspective of the RBV, there are several important implications for 
knowledge protection. First, during the last twelve years, knowledge-based resources 
became more and more recognized as critical for a firm’s competitive advantage [6, 
22, 23]. Hence, the protection of knowledge and knowledge capabilities becomes vital 
for firms to stay competitive. Second, only few scholars began to recognize the im-
portance of capabilities to protect knowledge [e.g.,13] as they allow to incorporate 
peculiarities of individual firms. Third, only few scholars highlighted that effective 
protection of a focal firm’s knowledge also depends on how it can deal with the capa-
bilities of externals to absorb core knowledge [e.g.,12]. These capabilities of externals 
have been widely referred to as absorptive capacity (ACAP) and are introduced in the 
following.  
2.3 Absorptive Capacity 
Although there is a broad range of conceptualizations for ACAP [25], it is widely 
known as a firms’ set of capabilities to identify, assimilate, and apply external 
knowledge to commercial ends [26]. A firm’s ACAP is positively influenced by IT 
capabilities and complementary organizational capabilities [11]. IT capabilities are 
outside-in, inside-out and spanning capabilities. Outside-in refers to the identification 
of external knowledge, e.g. inter-organizational electronic interfaces. Inside-out refers 
to the application of knowledge, e.g. employees’ basic IT skills. Spanning capabilities 
facilitate the assimilation of knowledge, i.e. the integration of outside-in and inside-
out by linking new knowledge with what the firm already knows [11, 27]. Comple-
mentary organizational capabilities refer to coordination and socialization. Coordina-
tion “enhance[s] knowledge exchange across intra- and inter-organizational bounda-
ries” [11], e.g. a team that monitors a virtual community (outside-in capability). So-
cialization “creates the conditions necessary to exchange knowledge” [11], e.g. shared 
language or common goals. 
To propose capabilities that reduce the risk that externals identify, assimilate, and 
apply knowledge and knowledge capabilities, this paper uses ACAP as a reference 
model. That is because there is vast literature on ACAP [28] as a widely accepted 
model for explaining an organization’s ability to identify, assimilate, and utilize 
knowledge.  
3 Towards a Capability Model for Knowledge Protection 
After introducing the basic concepts, it is necessary to relate them. Therefore, it is 
necessary to clearly describe the concept of protective capability. 
3.1 Protection Capabilities 
In literature on knowledge protection the concept of capabilities has either been 
used synonymous to that of resource or the differentiation between them remains 
vague. Hence, two questions remain unsolved in knowledge protection literature con-
cerning the differentiation between resources and capabilities. First, what exactly are 
protection capabilities and how do they differ from protection resources? This ques-
tion refers to the characteristics of resources and capabilities introduced earlier. Simi-
lar to RBV literature, protection resources are also inputs to a production process with 
protected knowledge as outcome, knowledge capabilities, and protected business 
strategy. Opposed to that, most knowledge protection literature focuses on protection 
resources. Intellectual property rights (IPRs) are treated as intangible assets [1], pro-
tection related know-how as person-dependent resource [29] technical measures as 
physical resources [14], HR mechanisms like top management support as person-
dependent resources [2] just to mention a few examples. However, on their own, few 
protection resources are productive. As an example, individual patents do not prevent 
imitation or substitution in some industries and, hence, firms need build specific com-
binations of patents, i.e. patent fences to protect their innovations [30]. Another ex-
ample is that the specific combination of skills makes a product complex and exacer-
bates imitation by externals [31]. Hence, firms need to build teams of protection re-
sources, specific combinations of coordination between resources and people as well 
as between people.  
The second question is what do protection capabilities protect? This question re-
fers to the boundary of protection capabilities, i.e. where they have the power to pro-
tect and where protection is beyond their scope. Taking the example from above, the 
capability of building patent fences strives to protect knowledge embedded in pro-
cesses and products [3] and, hence, to protect a resource. As protective capabilities 
are complex patterns of resources and people which hold tacit knowledge, patent 
fences cannot be considered to protect each type of organizational capabilities as the 
protection of tacit knowledge is beyond their scope [3]. This example indicates that 
the question of what capabilities ought to protect cannot be determined in a general 
way. To answer this question, ACAP can be used as a reference model to which pro-
tection capabilities are mirrored against. Depending on whether externals try to identi-
fy, assimilate, or apply knowledge, the focal firm has to protect resources, capabili-
ties, or its business strategy. This is explained in the following. Identifying external 
knowledge: identifying means observing knowledge which is determined by the ex-
tent of disclosure [32] and recognizing its value [33]. Capabilities, however, are not 
observable as they are invisible phenomena [34]. As a consequence, protection capa-
bilities to reduce the risk of knowledge identification have to focus on knowledge, i.e. 
the resource level. Assimilating identified knowledge: once identified, externals have 
to assimilate knowledge of the focal firm, i.e. to embed it into the existing knowledge 
base. The outcome of assimilation is a new organizational capability [35] as externals 
try to combine the identified knowledge with their other resources. However, to be 
able to imitate a capability, the absorbing organization needs to understand causal 
relationships between the knowledge identified, and other resources and people that 
constitute the capability. Hence, protection capabilities of firms reducing externals’ 
assimilation capabilities focus on the protection of capabilities. Applying assimilated 
knowledge: once knowledge has been identified and assimilated, externals need to put 
it into practice, i.e. to build a business strategy that exploits the assimilated 
knowledge best by assuring appropriability of returns [10, 23]. In this respect, a focal 
firm can reduce the risk that externals make use of the imitated capability. Here, pro-
tection capabilities operate on protecting a firm’s business strategy, by ensuring the 
appropriability of returns [10, 23]. 
Using ACAP as a framework, this paper proposes protection capabilities that help 
firms to reduce the risk of identification, assimilation, and application of their 
knowledge. These protection capabilities are proposed in the following. Since capa-
bilities are combinations of resources, and since the IT artifact is under-researched in 
knowledge protection literature [36] there is a stronger focus on what role IT plays in 
building each of the capability types. 
3.2 Concealment, Ambiguity, and Enforcement 
Starting from ACAP, this paper argues that firms can reduce the risk that 
knowledge is identified, assimilated, and applied by establishing concealment, ambi-
guity, and enforcement capabilities. Figure 1 illustrates the capability model. In the 
following, the three types of protection capabilities are proposed.  
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Figure 1: A capability model for knowledge protection 
Concealment capabilities: leveraging resources from outside is crucial for organi-
zations due to their limited internal resources [22]. In this respect ACAP postulates 
that organizations need to develop capabilities to identify external knowledge [11, 
26]. More concretely,  the observability of knowledge reflects the capability of exter-
nals to identify strategic knowledge of a focal firm [37]. Hence, reducing the observa-
bility can be understood as reducing externals’ capabilities to identify the knowledge. 
Observability depends on two characteristics: the “extent of disclosure” [32], as well 
as the ease of ”understanding and examining different aspects” of the knowledge [33]. 
In other words, the success of externals to identify knowledge of a focal firm depends 
on the level of disclosure and if the knowledge can easily be recognized as valuable. 
Here, some firms are able to manage to be less transparent or open than others [38]. 
As a consequence, firms need to learn how to do so and develop protection capabili-
ties that reduce the level of observability [3, 18]. This includes knowledge in people 
as well as process and product knowledge [39]. The level of disclosure is often deter-
mined by technical measures and prominently discussed in information security litera-
ture which are well applicable for explicit knowledge [39]. Here, Role-based access 
control-techniques are proposed for Knowledge Management System (KMS) design 
[40] which is especially important for inter-organizational workflows [41] and collab-
orative systems [42]. Another way of IT enhancing firms to reduce observability is 
(semi-) automation of text sanitization [43]. Together with intentionally using less 
rich media for transmission for specific cases [8], such technologies provide the capa-
bility to hide sensitive knowledge in documents [43] and protect them from externals’ 
observation. However, these measures themselves are no capabilities. Hence, the 
establishment of routines by combining and coordinating IT resources with people 
and other protection resources is crucial. One important aspect in this respect is the 
establishment of routines to increase security awareness to hinder protection measures 
to be bypassed. Similar to what Roberts et al. [11] describe as developing a shared 
ideology towards knowledge transfer, knowledge protection also requires shared lan-
guage, common goals, or cohesion [29]. A firm needs to establish an adequate level of 
knowledge protection awareness to ensure that protection measures to reduce disclo-
sure of knowledge can be established. For example, employees might not know what 
to protect and what not if they are not aware of the firm’s competitive knowledge [2]. 
An example of such a capability that combines and enhances coordinating protection 
measures to reduce disclosure with people involved in protection processes is a KMS 
that helps “firstly to store and communicate security related knowledge contents and 
secondly to allow users to compare their security-relevant activities with security 
policies, and to either suggest on security policy amendments or additions to training 
programs” [44].  
To reduce the recognition of the value of knowledge, increasing its contextualiza-
tion is helpful. Contextualization can be understood as the process of embodying ex-
plicit knowledge into implicit knowledge [45] and, hence, can be referred to as inter-
nalization [46]. In this paper the focus is on internalization within organizational 
boundaries. Tacit knowledge is deeply rooted in an individual’s commitment to a 
specific context and action [46], and hence it is more difficult for an external observer 
to recognize the value of tacit than explicit knowledge. That is, because increasing 
contextualization of knowledge requires an external to have a higher level of prior 
related knowledge to recognize its value. Prior related knowledge of a firm is the 
existing domain-specific knowledge base [11]. New knowledge is related to this prior 
knowledge to be able to be absorbed. Externals with a low level of prior knowledge 
cannot simply forward tacit knowledge like documents to someone who has a higher 
level. Although contextualization can be considered as a capability itself [35], combi-
nation of routines with IT is of value. Increasing computer-based communication is 
one solution [47] although it might sound counter-intuitive for a moment. However, it 
is important to notice that such systems should be established within organizational 
boundaries and separated from communication channels with externals. To internalize 
on an organizational level, explicit knowledge has to be shared [46] and integrating 
internal computer-based communication systems, together with the capabilities to 
reduce disclosure described above, help to spread explicit knowledge throughout but 
within the boundary of the organization. 
Ambiguity capabilities: as mentioned, assimilation serves to produce new organi-
zational capabilities [35]. ACAP postulates that externals can better assimilate and 
apply knowledge gained from a focal firm when they have similar resources, e.g. 
skills, or knowledge [6]. That is because it takes more to assimilate and imitate capa-
bilities than just exposing individuals to new knowledge. One way of reducing the 
externals capabilities to assimilate is to establish and maintain causal ambiguity. 
Causal ambiguity describes the nature of causal relationships between actions and 
results [48] and helps to build barriers to imitation [31]. Increasing causal ambiguity 
makes it difficult for externals to comprehend the competencies on which certain 
outcomes are based [31]. Consequently, causal ambiguity protects on the capability 
level as it exacerbates to understand how different resources and people are combined 
and coordinated together with the already identified knowledge so that they can imi-
tate the capability. One aspect to increase causal ambiguity is to increase complexity 
of a firm’s competencies, i.e. capabilities themselves [31]. Complexity refers to pat-
terns of “interdependent technologies, routines, individuals, and resources linked to a 
particular knowledge” [38]. Increased complexity makes capabilities more difficult to 
comprehend by externals [10] because “the causes of success and failure are often 
difficult to assign…[and]…the establishment of cause-effect relationships can be very 
difficult" [49]. As a consequence, firms need an ambiguity capability that helps to 
create complex skill patterns, resource deployments [31] as well as complex relation-
ships between capabilities different from the knowledge base of externals. One im-
portant factor of complexity is integrating broad-spans of different knowledge-based 
resources into capabilities [38]. Drawing on the argumentations above, the key to an 
ambiguity capability is that the focal firm should be able to integrate across the broad-
spans of knowledge-based resources to understand the causal relationships [38] whilst 
externals should not. For the integration part, KMS integrate broad-spans of 
knowledge helping firms to locate documents, update knowledge elements, coordinate 
KM tasks etc. [23]. However, firms need to be able to control who is involved in inte-
grative operations in KMS to assure that the complexity of relationships between 
knowledge-based resources, routines, people etc. cannot be understood by externals. 
Here, using security concepts like role-based access control or obligation- and condi-
tion-based usage control for knowledge management systems [40] is valuable. Firms 
can control who has access to what and define conditions and obligations underlying 
an activity that is performed using a KMS. This way, firms can steer who is able to 
understand the causal relationships in what way. 
Furthermore, increasing contextualization of knowledge also helps firms to exacer-
bate assimilation of knowledge by externals as the decision rules and protocols are 
hard to codify through “the skilled operator’s own level of unawareness” [31]. And, 
hence, an external cannot fully understand how actions and results relate with increas-
ing tacitness [31]. This relationship between causal ambiguity and contextualization 
highlights that reducing observability by increasing tacitness of core knowledge also 
reduces the risk of assimilation. 
Enforcement capabilities: ACAP literature proposes that, besides capabilities to 
identify and assimilate, externals need to be able to apply knowledge which can be 
achieved by means of inside-out capabilities. In other words, once externals assimilat-
ed knowledge and built capabilities therewith, they need to put it into practice, i.e. 
build a business strategy that exploits the assimilated knowledge best by assuring 
appropriability of returns [10, 23]. This paper argues that a focal firm needs protection 
capabilities to reduce the risk that externals apply knowledge. There are basically two 
ways discussed in literature to protect knowledge after being disclosed and assimilat-
ed. Protection (1) via IPR [1, 3] and (2) building trust to prevent externals from op-
portunistic behaviour [6]. However, trust building implies willingness to form organi-
zational partnerships. Since firms also need to reduce the risk of utilizing knowledge 
by competitors or even unknown players in the market, the aspect of building trust is 
neglected here. In terms of IPR, single patents may not prevent imitation or substitu-
tion and, hence, firms need build capabilities, i.e. specific routines to establish and 
maintain patent fences [30]. Here, combining patent fences with IT that supports to 
manage them is of value. In this respect, property asset management systems or enter-
prise intellectual asset management systems [50] provide firms with analysis tools, 
databases, as well as matching algorithms to find similar intellectual properties of 
externals or incompatibilities between patents of the focal firm.  
Another point is that, similar to what ACAP proposes, firms also need to manage 
dependencies among its various activities to enhance protection, i.e. build an over-
arching protection strategy [29] to protect the business strategy. A firm’s enforcement 
capability also refers to the establishment of an overarching protection strategy to 
effectively apply IPR. Drawing from information security literature, firms need to 
establish IPR requirements, controls to enforce them, as well as auditing procedures 
[51]. One approach could be seen in the IT architecture proposed by [52]: Adapted to 
knowledge protection firms should establish links between high-level IPR protection 
requirements, controls and configurations of property asset management systems or 
enterprise intellectual asset management systems. Through these linkages, firms can 
build the capability to measure performance of IPR protection to prevent leaks that 
could lead to appropriation [18]. By constantly monitoring the compliance status of 
IPR protection requirements, a firm is able to evaluate the enforcement of protection 
via IPR. This also enables firms to change or reconfigure their substantive enforce-
ment capabilities [cf. 11]. Helpful in this respect could be technologies that enable 
continuous auditing, e.g., by using a process mining approach for constantly checking 
for compliance [53]. 
4 Discussion 
Knowledge protection literature mainly focuses on the effectiveness of applying 
measures in a generalized way, widely ignoring abilities of individual firms in how 
they can build capabilities around the measures. Drawing on the RBV, this paper 
addresses this problem presenting a model that (1) proposes three types of protection 
capabilities. (2) This paper argues how these protection capabilities help to reduce the 
risk that knowledge is identified, assimilated, and utilized. (3) This paper differenti-
ates between the levels on which protection capabilities operate: protecting resources, 
capabilities, or the business strategy of a focal firm. Concerning (1) this paper goes 
beyond current knowledge protection literature as it clearly distinguishes between the 
concepts of resource and capability and provides concealment, ambiguity, and en-
forcement capability types. Concerning (2) the model considers peculiarities of indi-
vidual firms by the fact that the firms’ own protection capabilities are mirrored 
against the ACAP of individual external organizations. Here, concealment help to 
reduce the risk to identify knowledge, ambiguity to reduce assimilation, and enforce-
ment to reduce application. Concerning (3) the paper anchors the concept of protec-
tion capabilities in the RBV by arguing that concealment capabilities protect 
knowledge resources, ambiguity capabilities protect knowledge capabilities, and en-
forcement capabilities protect the business strategy of a firm. 
4.1 Implications 
Managerial implications: First of all firms might rethink their approach to 
knowledge protection. Although, many firms do not have knowledge protection on 
their radar [54], those who do should not consider protection solely as application of 
measures [cf. 29] but rather as a set of capabilities. Firms could ask themselves “what 
protection capabilities do we need to protect our knowledge, our capabilities and our 
business strategy”, “how can we build, or enhance these capabilities”, or “how do we 
have to reconfigure them depending on the ACAP of externals”. In the course of this 
firms might think of how IT resources can be used to build protection capabilities. 
Here, they can consider the use of new technology enhancing capabilities like KMS 
that incorporate user knowledge on security awareness [44]. 
Research implications: There are several implications for research from introduc-
ing this capability model. First of all, this paper tries to highlight the need to sharpen 
the different concepts of resources and capabilities. Protection resources themselves 
often fail to adequately protect [30], whilst their combination with other protection 
resources help firms to deal with externals’ ACAP. This leads to the second point: this 
paper tries to shift the focus in knowledge protection literature from the application of 
protection resources to their combination and utilization as protection capabilities. 
This enables to consider the peculiarities of individual firms and, hence, helps them to 
balance sharing and protecting. This so called boundary paradox [6, 9] refers to the 
need of firms to access external knowledge due to limited resources and protect inter-
nal knowledge. Recently, no literature provides solutions to solve it. 
4.2 Boundaries of the research and further research 
It is necessary to explicate the boundaries of this conceptual paper as there are 
some limitations to the explanatory power and comprehensiveness of the model.  
Explanatory power of the model: This model makes no statements on the extent to 
which the capabilities can reduce identification, assimilation, and application. In this 
respect, further studies need to investigate the influential strength of the capabilities 
on (1) externals’ ACAP and (2) the focal firm’s overall protection performance. With 
respect to (1) no work could be found that makes statements thereon and, hence, fur-
ther exploratory studies are of importance. For (2), literature indicates that to a certain 
extent, contextualization can even be effective “for resolving comprehension difficul-
ties arising from the users' lack of task domain knowledge“ [55]. Similarly, a too high 
level of causal ambiguity leads to a situation where even employees of the focal firm 
do not understand how actions and outcomes relate [31]. Further studies need to in-
vestigate the relationships of concealment, ambiguity, and enforcement capability 
with a firm’s protection performance and associated coordination costs. Furthermore, 
the model makes no statements on the relationships between the capabilities them-
selves. As indicated, the level of contextualization positively influences causal ambi-
guity [38]. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that concealment capabilities affect am-
biguity capabilities. In other words, firms that increase tacitness of knowledge might 
also increase causal ambiguity. Further studies should also investigate how conceal-
ment and ambiguity capabilities relate to enforcement capabilities. 
Comprehensiveness of the model: The paper does not claim that the proposed set 
of capability types is comprehensive. It might occur in further studies that there are 
more than three types of capabilities reducing the ACAP of externals. Additionally 
the IT resources are of exemplary character. Due to the fact that the IT artifact is 
mainly absent in knowledge protection literature [36] it might be of value to perform 
deeper investigations on which IT might contribute in what way to the three capability 
types. 
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